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Abstract—Many electoral jurisdictions have their 
own distinctive voting schemes.  There is no clear 
consensus about the ideal voting scheme for fair 
elections.  Various systems for electronic and online 
voting have been either proposed or developed, but 
these systems tend to be aimed at particular vote 
counting schemes e.g. plurality. This paper proposes 
a way to decouple the ballot casting process from 
the vote counting scheme, using a generalized ballot 
schema. 
Index Terms— Voting Scheme, Component Based 
Architecture
I.INTRODUCTION
Social choice theorems such as those of Arrow [1] indicate 
that  there  are  trade-offs  in  the  design  of  voting  schemes. 
There  is  no  single  ideal  voting  scheme that  fulfills  all  the 
desirable  criteria  for  fair  elections,  under  all  circumstances. 
Accordingly, many electoral jurisdictions have developed their 
own distinctive voting schemes.  Digital voting systems (either 
electronic or online) are not always easily transferrable from 
one  voting  scheme  to  another.   This  makes  digital  voting 
systems either more expensive, less useful or less reliable than 
they  could  be,  since  each  jurisdiction  must  do  its  own 
development, testing and verification.  In other words, digital 
voting  systems  have  tended  to  be  developed  as  once-off 
bespoke software rather than using standard re-usable software 
components.
Various  systems  have  been  proposed  for  secure  digital 
voting,  including  for  example  Helios  [2],  Prêt  à  Voter  [3], 
Scantegrity  [4],  and  VoteBox  [5].  Each  of  these  implicitly 
presupposes a specific voting scheme or else a set of related 
schemes e.g. plurality.  They are not necessarily designed to be 
easily adapted to work with a different voting scheme.  
This is potentially wasteful, particularly when an election 
authority  chooses  to  invest  in  technology  to  improve  the 
election  process.   It  risks  having  sunk  costs  due  to 
abandonment of the existing investment, if there were ever to 
be a radical innovation in its  voting scheme, for example a 
move from preferential voting to an open list, or vice versa. 
The next  section will  describe some of  the  main voting 
schemes in use throughout the world today.   The following 
section will describe a generic representation of ballots, and 
the section after that will describe how the generic ballots can 
be used with the various voting schemes.
II. VOTING SCHEMES
A voting  scheme is  an  algorithm for  counting  of  ballot 
papers.   The main families  of  voting schemes are Plurality, 
Ranked Choice, Approval or Score Voting, Open List, Closed 
List and Hybrid schemes. 
Many proposed solutions for electronic voting depend on 
assumptions about how the ballots might be counted i.e. which 
voting scheme is in place.  This is often reflected in the design 
of  the ballots.   However  it  is  desirable  that  ballot  counting 
algorithms are designed according to the needs of the election, 
rather  than  according  to  the  constraints  of  the  current 
technology.  
A  common  abstract  data  model  for  ballots,  that  will 
support (almost) all possible methods for counting of ballots, 
is needed in order to develop a common security framework 
for voting.  Different voting methods could then be plugged in 
to the common framework.
A. Plurality
Plurality is the  simplest possible form of voting scheme. 
Which ever candidate gets the most votes is the winner.  Some 
variants of plurality have a second round in which voters must 
choose  between  the  highest  two  candidates  from  the  first 
round.   Another  variant  is  block  voting,  where  there  are 
multiple positions to fill and each voter has multiple votes, e.g. 
if  there  are  3  positions  to  fill,  each  voter  chooses  up  to  3 
candidates, and the 3 candidates with most votes are elected.
B. Ranked Choice Voting
Also known as Preferential Voting or Single Transferable 
Vote, Ranked Choice Voting is normally used in multi-winner 
districts so as to achieve proportional representation.   Each 
voter ranks the candidates in strict order of  preference,  e.g. 
first, second, third and so on.
Proportional  representation  is  achieved  using  ranked 
choice voting in multi-member districts.  A quota is calculated 
so that  number  of  candidates  with a  quota  of  votes  cannot 
exceed the number of vacancies to be filled.  If a candidate 
receives more votes than the quota, the surplus votes may be 
redistributed.   There  are  many  different  methods  for 
redistribution of surplus votes, for example Meek [6].
Ranked choice voting can be viewed as a generalization of 
single-winner plurality voting, and it would reduce to plurality 
voting if all voters used only their first preferences.
C. Approval and Score Voting
Approval Voting allows to express approval or disapproval 
of each candidate.  A more general form of Approval Voting, 
known as Score Voting or Range Voting, allows the voters to 
indicate  the  intensity  of  approval  or  disapproval  for  each 
candidate.
D. Open List and Closed List Voting
List  systems  achieve  proportional  representation  by 
allowing voters to choose one list of candidates.  If we allow 
voters to also vote for a specific candidate within their party, 
then it is an open list system. 
III. BALLOT SCHEMA DEFINITION
The section  describes  a  ballot  schema  which  can  be 
interpreted according to any of the voting schemes described 
in this paper.  The generic ballot schema contains four levels:
 Approval or disapproval of lists of candidates
 Priority of approved lists
 Approval or disapproval of individual candidates
 Priority of approved candidates
A. Approval or Dissapproval of each List
The  voter gives  approval or  disapproval to each list  of 
candidates.  The default option is non-approval.  Disapproval 
of a list implies disapproval of all candidates on that list.
B. Priority for each approved list.
For each list to which approval was given the voter enters 
a  positive  whole  number  e.g.  1,2,3,..;  the  lowest  number 
indicates  highest  preference.  The  scores  do  not  need  to  be 
contiguous or unique.  Priority  can be interpreted either as a 
relative  preference  or  an  absolute  score,  depending  on  the 
counting  scheme.  Two  or  more  lists  can  be  given  first 
preference;  depending  on  the  voting  scheme  that  could  be 
interpreted  as  a  range  vote,  a  spoilt  vote  or  fractional  first 
preferences.  All approved lists must be given a numeric value 
to  indicate  degree  of  approval;  a  blank  value  implies 
disapproval.
If  the  voter  disapproves  more  strongly  of  one  list  than 
another, then this can be indicated by giving a weak approval 
to one and a disapproval to the one other. 
C. Approval or Disapproval of each Candidate
The  voter  indicates  approval  or  disapproval  of  each 
candidate within an approved list.   The default option is 
disapproval, so that a voter can choose to vote in plurality 
style by approving only one candidate.
D. Preference or Score for each Candidate
 The  voter  gives  a  score  or  preference  for  each 
candidate approved, where the best score is 1, the next best 
is 2 and so on.  The scores need not be contiguous.  The 
voter may rank two or more candidates at the same score. 
This allows the voter to use ranked choice style if required.
 
IV.WORKED EXAMPLES
This section describes how various voting schemes can use 
the generic ballot schema.
A. List-Approval Voting Scheme
This  first  example  is  a  fictional  voting  scheme,  chosen 
purely to illustrate the flexible application of generic ballots.
Voters choose one list and indicate approval or disapproval 
of  each  candidate  on  that  list.   There  can  be  a  second 
preference list in case the the first list is below threshold or 
does not have enough candidates.  
This scheme uses the top three levels of information in the 
ballot  and ignores the information about relative priority  of 
approved candidates.
B. Single-Winner Range Voting
In  range  voting,  the  sum  of  priorities  is  calculated  for  all 
candidates, except that non-approval of list is counted as the 
minimum allowed priority for all candidates on that list e.g. 99 
or 999. The priority of  a list is counted as the default priority 
for all candidates on that list, except where a specific priority 
is  given to an individual candidate. The candidate with the 
lowest overall sum of priorities is the winner.
C. Multi Winner Plurality
In multi winner plurality, the voter has one vote for each 
vacant  position.   Suppose,  for  example  that  there  are  3 
positions to be filled, then the top 3 preferences of each ballot 
are counted at  equal value.   The candidates with most,  2nd 
most and 3rd most votes are elected.
D. PR-STV with fractional counting
The first preference candidate on the first preference list is 
counted  as  the  overall  first  preference,  followed  by  the 
next  preference  candidate  on  the  first  list,  until  all 
approved candidates from the first list are ranked, then the 
approve candidates from the next list  are counted as the 
next preferences.  Two or more lists with the same priority 
are treated as the same list when determining the order of 
the candidates.
E. Open List
The first priority approved list from the ballot is counted as 
the party vote.   The first priority approved candidate on 
that list is counted as the personal vote.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper has shown a generic ballot schema that be used 
with potentially any vote counting algorithm, thus decoupling 
the  ballot  casting stage  from the  vote  counting stage  of  an 
election.   This  will  allow  voting  systems  to  be  designed 
developed  in  a  modular  way,  so  that  different  voting 
algorithms can be plugged in  to a  common framework that 
supports different mechanisms for ballot counting.
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